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Openness and Growth: What’s the Empirical Relationship? 
Robert E. Baldwin, University of Wisconsin-Madison and NBER 
I. Introduction 
  The manner in which the international economic policies of governments affect the rates 
of growth of their economies has long been a subject of controversy.  This situation continues 
today.  Despite a number of multi-country case studies utilizing comparable analytical 
frameworks, numerous econometric studies using large cross-country data sets, and important 
theoretical advances concerning how a country’s international economic policies and its rate of 
economic growth interact, there is still disagreement among economists concerning the nature of 
the relationship.  
  There are several reasons for this.  A key one is the difference among investigators in the 
manner they define the issue being studied.  Some authors focus on whether there is a causal 
relationship between such variables as increases in trade or foreign direct investment and 
increases in growth rates (or between increases in growth and increases in trade or investment), 
no matter what the reasons for the changes in these economic variables.  However, most authors 
are interested in the effects of differences in government policies on economic growth.  The 
impact of policies affecting the “openness” of a country to trade and investment or its “inward-
orientation” or “outward-orientation” is the subject of many studies.  But, of course, just how  
broadly one defines such terms greatly affects one’s conclusions about a particular country or set 
of countries.  One can interpret openness in narrow terms to include only import and export taxes 
or subsidies as well as explicit nontariff distortions of trade or in varying degrees of broadness to 




other regulatory policies, education policies, the nature of the legal system, the form of 
government, and the general nature of institutions and culture.   
Differences in the quality and detail of the data being analyzed are another source of 
disagreement among economists on the subject.  Those who study trade and growth relationships 
among developing countries are greatly hampered by the lack of good data even on such matters 
as levels of import protection, and they often are forced to undertake case studies.  While many 
insights have been revealed from such studies about the nature of the development process and 
its relationship with trade, some are reluctant to draw broad generalizations from them because 
of their specificity and the bias that the personal viewpoints of the authors may introduce into the 
analyses.  In contrast, while econometric analyses based on quantitative data concerning trade 
and growth for a cross section of countries do permit broad generalizations, these studies are 
limited by the scope and comparability of available quantitative data.  Differences in what 
investigators regard as appropriate econometric models and tests for sensitivity of the results to 
alternative specifications that may be based in part on the personal policy predilections of the 
authors can also result in significant differences in the conclusions reached under such 
quantitative approaches. 
  The purpose of this paper is to survey briefly the views of economists and policymakers 
since around the end World War II concerning the relationships between economic openness and 
growth, indicating how and why these views have significantly changed over the last fifty years 
and pointing out the main reasons for the disagreements.  Section II examines the 1950s and 
1960s when import substitution was the dominant growth policy in the developing countries and 
there was also extensive government intervention in many industrial countries aimed at 




which the findings from an increasing number of studies of the growth experiences of individual 
countries caused more and more economists and policymakers to become skeptical about the 
growth merits of import substitution policies and to begin to advocate more export-oriented, 
outward-looking trade policies.  Section IV briefly outlines some of the new relationships 
between trade and growth brought out by the so-called “new growth” literature of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s which, together with the development of new econometric techniques for 
dealing with time series data, has stimulated new efforts to unravel the relationships between 
trade and growth through cross-countries statistical analyses.  Section V briefly reviews the 
major studies of this period, all of which reach the general conclusion that openness is associated 
with higher growth rates.  This conclusion has, however, been recently challenged in a detailed, 
carefully reasoned critique of these papers by Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik (2001).  
These authors contend that, in fact, because of various methodological shortcomings in these 
studies, one should conclude that there is very little evidence that trade openness is significantly 
associated with economic growth.  Section V summarizes the criticisms of the paper by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik.  Section VI concludes with an evaluation of the new studies and the 
critique by Rodriguez and Rodrik.  
 II. The Widespread Acceptance of Import Substitution Policies as the Means to     
Stimulate Economic Growth 
  As more and more countries obtained their independence from the colonial powers in the 
period shortly after the end of World War II, a widespread view developed among economists 
and policymakers that the best way for these countries to develop more rapidly was to stimulate 
industrialization by adopting import-substitution policies.  There seemed to be a number of good 




were keenly aware not only that most of the countries from whom they obtained independence 
had much higher per capita income levels and were much more industrialized but that their 
former rulers had imposed economic policies in the past which discouraged industrialization 
within the new nations.  To these new leaders, industrialization seemed to offer the possibility of 
achieving faster growth, higher per capita income levels and the attainment of the economic and 
military power needed for national security.  
 An economically sensible way of achieving industrialization seemed to be to restrict 
imports of manufactured goods for which there already was a domestic demand in order both to 
shift this demand toward domestic producers and permit the use of the country’s primary-product 
export earnings to import the capital goods needed for industrialization.  There also appeared to 
be a number of examples where high levels of import protection in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century had contributed positively to industrialization.  Although Great Britain had adopted a 
policy of free trade during its period of rapid growth in the nineteenth century, the United States 
seemed to industrialize and prosper by imposing high import duties on manufactures for much of 
the later part of the nineteenth century.  Germany and France also adopted protectionist policies 
during this period, as did Japan after 1900.
1  The impressive degree of industrialization achieved 
by the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s and by China after 1949 by pursuing inward-looking 
policies were additional historical examples that impressed the leaders of the newly independent 
nations. 
  The so-called infant industry argument first set forth in 1791 by Alexander  
Hamilton, further elaborated by Friedrich List (1856), and accepted by many classical and neo-
classical economists as the major theoretically valid exception to the case for worldwide free 
                                                      
1 See O’Rourke (2000) and Clemens and Williamson (2001) for evidence supporting the positive effects of tariffs on 




trade provided economic support for import substitution policies.  John Stuart Mill, who first 
formalized the argument in economic terms, argued that it takes time for new producers in a 
country to become “educated to the level of those with whom the processes are traditional” and 
thus for their unit costs to decline.  The infant industry argument maintains that during the 
temporary period when domestic costs in an industry are above the product’s import price, a 
tariff is a socially desirable method of financing the investment in human resources needed to 
compete successfully with foreign producers.   
Soon after World War II, Raul Prebisch (1950), the Secretary General of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and later the founder and Secretary General of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), among others argued 
that the infant industry argument was applicable to the entire manufacturing sector and not just to 
a single industry.  He also claimed that an ongoing secular decline in the prices of primary 
products (the exports of the less developed countries) relative to the prices of manufactured 
goods (the exports of the developed countries) and the low elasticity of demand for primary 
products made expansion in the production of primary products unattractive.  Focussing on 
producing labor-intensive manufactured goods, e.g., clothing, for export purposes also did not 
appeal to most less developed countries at this time because of the belief that a balanced 
industrial structure, such as existed in most developed countries, was necessary to achieve their 
goal of high per capita income levels and, moreover, because high levels of import duties and 
other import barriers still existed in the developed countries on most of these goods.   
  Although most economic leaders of less developed countries looked favorably on the 
strategy of import substitution, they also often found themselves backed into such a policy 




War II and the economic expansion plans of their new leaders, there was a tremendous demand 
on their part for both capital goods and consumer goods.  This meant that their existing foreign 
exchange reserves were quickly used up, with current export earnings being unable to fill the gap 
between demand and supply at existing exchange rates.  Consequently, most of these countries 
felt forced to impose foreign exchange and import controls to conserve their available export 
earnings and to establish a rationing system for the available foreign exchange to ensure that 
consumer necessities such as food and medicine, key intermediate inputs such as fuel, and 
essential capital goods could be imported in sufficient quantities to prevent serious political 
unrest and still permit the pursuit of their development goals.  One consequence was that very 
high levels of implicit protection were put in place on so-called “nonessential” manufactured 
goods.   
  Import substitution policies actually worked quite well initially.  The high prices of 
imported nonessentials shifted domestic demand for these goods from foreign to local producers 
with the result that there were significant increases in the output of simple manufactured goods 
as governments provided domestic producers with the foreign exchange needed to import key 
intermediate inputs and capital goods.  Many manufacturing activities consisted largely of 
simply assembling the components of goods produced abroad, e.g., cars.  Since the production of 
most of these products intensively utilized the type of labor that was relatively abundant in the 
newly industrializing nations, namely, unskilled labor, the adverse effects on economic 
efficiency of these early import substitution efforts were not sufficient to offset the growth 
effects of the import substitution policies.  Moreover, in this early period, the overvalued 




policies not only did not seem to reduce earnings from primary-product exports significantly but 
kept import prices of needed capital goods and intermediate inputs relatively low.   
  As import substitution policies continued and a number of developing countries extended 
these policies to cover more and more intermediate inputs and capital goods, the drawbacks of 
such a policy approach became increasingly apparent.  In particular, the hardships imposed on 
the export sector began to have adverse growth effects.  An overvalued currency meant that the 
number of units of foreign exchange received by exporters remained low while, at the same time, 
these producers were forced to purchase more and more intermediate inputs and capital goods 
domestically at high prices.  The resulting squeeze on profit margins forced them to curtail 
export production.  The higher skill and technology requirements for the more complex 
intermediates and capital goods and lack of large domestic markets needed to achieve efficient 
levels of production of these goods also worsened the profit outlook for domestic producers.  At 
the same time, aggressive expansionary activities by governments and private businesses fueled 
greater inflationary pressures with the result that large government budget deficits and balance-
of-payments deficits became commonplace.  The ensuing budget and balance-of-payments crises 
were often met by still tighter controls over exchange rates and imports and more extensive 
government intervention in the economy.  The net outcome was generally a slowing in the 
growth rate compared to the early period of import substitution.  
  Given the widespread agreement among economists today that that the import 
substitution strategy for did not work out well for most developing countries, an important 
question to ask is why so many economists were wrong in their predictions that such an approach 
would be successful in raising long-run growth rates for these countries.  What went wrong with 




infant industry argument and a failure to take account of the macroeconomic consequences of 
such a policy when applied to all manufacturing.
2  
  Consider the argument set forth earlier that new producers need to be protected for a 
temporary period so they can acquire the experience and production skills that will make them as 
efficient as their long-time foreign competitors.  As James Meade (1955) pointed out many years 
ago, the existence during the early period of production of higher costs than foreign competitors 
is, by itself, an insufficient reason to justify tariff protection on economic efficiency grounds.  If 
unit costs in an industry are low enough after the learning period to yield a discounted surplus of 
revenues over costs (and thus indicate a comparative advantage for the country in producing the 
product), it should be possible for firms to raise sufficient funds in the capital market to cover 
their initial excess of expenditures over revenues.  These circumstances are no different from 
those in which firms go to the capital market for funds to cover the excess of expenditures over 
receipts during the early stages of production because of the need to purchase indivisible units of 
physical capital.  Imperfections in capital markets may prevent access to capital markets but the 
existence of market imperfections is a quite different case for government intervention than the 
infant industry argument.  
  As Meade (1955) also noted, the key argument on which the infant industry case must 
rest relates to technological externalities associated with the learning process.  For example, 
consider the matter of acquiring the knowledge about local production techniques needed to 
compete effectively with foreign producers.  An entrepreneur who incurs these costs of 
discovering the best way to produce a particular good faces the problem that this information 
may become freely available to other potential local producers, who can utilize it at the same 
time as the initial firm but without incurring the full costs of the knowledge acquisition.  
                                                      




Competition from these other producers could then either drive up factor prices or push down the 
product’s price to levels where the initial firm is unable to recover its costs of gaining this 
knowledge.  Realizing that this outcome is possible, firms will be discouraged from undertaking 
the initial knowledge-acquisition costs.
3 
  The imposition of a temporary protective duty is, however, no guarantee that individual 
entrepreneurs will undertake additional investment in knowledge acquisition.  An import tax 
raises the domestic price of a product and, from the viewpoint of the industry as a whole, makes 
some investments in knowledge more profitable.  But individual producers still face the same 
externality problem as before, namely, that other firms will copy, with little cost to themselves, 
any new technical knowledge discovered by the firm and drive the product’s price down to a 
level where the initial firm will be unable to recoup its costs of acquiring this knowledge.  If 
there were always some technologically fixed time lag between the introduction of a new, 
cheaper production technique and the change in product or factor prices caused by the entry of 
the firms who copy the new production method, a duty would operate to make investment in 
knowledge acquisition more profitable for the individual firm in the industry.  But, to make a 
point too often ignored in such discussions, the speed with which firms respond to market 
opportunities is itself a function of the level of profit prospects.  A duty will make it worthwhile 
for firms to incur the costs of acquiring the knowledge discovered by other firms faster and also 
to move into production more rapidly at high output levels.  What is needed, of course, is a 
subsidy to the initial entrants into the industry for the purpose of discovering the better 
production techniques. 
                                                      
3 See Baldwin (1969) for a more complete discussion of this point and its policy implications.  Hausmann and 




  Up to the post-World War II period when some economists began to extend the infant 
industry argument to all manufacturing, economists had generally framed this argument for 
temporary protection in partial equilibrium terms.  It focused on a single industry, and it was 
assumed that the temporary import protection granted had no appreciable effect on such 
macroeconomic variables as exchange rates, aggregate exports and imports, and monetary or 
fiscal policies.  Early proponents of aggressively protecting large segments of the manufacturing 
sector did not fully appreciate the implications of their policy suggestions on these 
macroeconomic variables.  They did not, for example, take sufficient account of the adverse 
effects of import substitution on aggregate exports and, thus, on the foreign exchange earnings so 
essential for importing the capital goods and essential intermediate inputs needed to permit the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector.  Nor did they realize the extent to which government 
actions to conserve foreign exchange by limiting imports of luxury consumer goods would make 
the domestic production of these goods the most attractive for domestic entrepreneurs and thus 
bias the pattern of production in a direction that the government did not particularly want.  They 
also failed to appreciate the extent of the budget and inflationary pressures that would be 
generated by the development actions of governments and domestic producers.  Indeed, it was 
the macroeconomic crises associated with unsustainable import deficits for central banks, 
unmanageable government budget deficits, runaway inflation, etc. that had the greater effect in 
finally turning most countries away from import substitution policies than a realization of the 
serious resource misallocation effects of these policies.   
III.  The Shift to Outward-Oriented Policies 
  The first group of developing countries to shift from an inward-oriented to outward-




and South Korea.  (Hong Kong had long pursued open trade and investment policies.)  South 
Korea, for example, was characterized by extensive quantitative controls over trade and 
international payments from the time it separated from North Korea in 1945 through the end of 
the Korean War in 1953.  Inward-looking actions continued to dominate government 
development policy after 1953, with an increasingly elaborate multiple exchange rate system 
being established in the attempt to deal with the problems of a large trade deficit and an 
overvalued exchange rate.
4  While a large currency devaluation took place in 1961 along with 
efforts to liberalize the trade and payments system, this liberalization effort ended in 1963 as 
rapid inflation was fed by excessively expansionary fiscal policies and a poor crop.  However, a 
further liberalization effort begun in 1964 and 1965 was much more successful so that by 1966 
the trade and payments regime was fairly liberal compared with earlier years.  The country 
became increasingly outward-oriented as the government adopted other policies that encouraged 
exports of manufactured goods.   
  Even though they undertook periodic attempts to liberalize their trade and payments 
regimes, most other developing countries continued to follow what was basically an import 
substitution approach to growth until the 1980s.  However, the debt crisis of 1982 convinced 
many developing-country governments that inward-looking policies were no longer sustainable, 
particularly for smaller countries.  They had borrowed heavily in international markets in order 
to cope with the trade-deficit problem associated with the import substitution approach only to 
find that the high and sustainable growth rates sought still did not materialize and, instead, that 
they were left with massive international debts they could no longer service.  Such traditional 
                                                      





adherents to the import substitution approach as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, Ghana, and 
Uganda began to adopt more outward-looking policies.   
While the inability to borrow the funds needed to reestablish their import-substitution 
regimes and the remarkable growth record of more and more East Asian countries under 
outward-oriented policies were probably the main immediate reasons for the shift in growth 
policy, the gradual shift in thinking by economists both in academia and in international 
organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and even the United 
Nations Commission for Latin America in favor of outward-looking over inward-looking 
policies also was an important factor.  
  This change in conventional thinking by economists and policymakers about the best 
policy approach to promote growth in the developing countries was significantly influenced by a 
series of detailed country studies together with some cross-country statistical analyses of the 
import substitution process and by new theoretical modeling of the interactions between trade 
and growth.  Both the studies of commercial policies in developing countries directed by Ian 
Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott (1970) and by Bela Balassa (1971) utilized the newly 
formalized concept of the effective rate of protection to compare import substitution policies 
across industries and countries.
5  This concept measures protection on a value-added basis rather 
than on the basis of the final price of a product and thus takes account of the level of protection 
on intermediate inputs as well as the final product.  It brings out the point that, if a good is 
exported without any export subsidy but the exporter must purchase protected domestically-
produced intermediate inputs, the primary factors involved in the value-added process are 




inputs or they are lower than those on the final product are, the primary factors producing the 
value-added are protected to a greater degree than the rate of protection on the final product 
indicates.   
  Both the Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) and Balassa (1971) studies brought out the 
fact that the average rate of protection of value-added in manufacturing was extraordinarily high 
in most developing countries - - much higher than nominal rates of protection and often 
exceeding 100 percent.  Moreover, there was great variability among industries and broad sectors 
that often seemed to make little economic sense.  An extreme example was Chile’s effective rate 
of protection in 1961 of 2,884 percent for processed foods in contrast to 300 percent for 
nondurable consumer goods (Balassa, 1971, p. 54).  Perhaps, most important, however, was the 
degree to which the studies demonstrated the discrimination against exports, mainly agricultural 
and mineral products.  In some countries, there actually were negative rates of protection in these 
sectors, e.g., agriculture in Pakistan and mining and energy in Malaysia (see Balassa, 1971, 
p.54).  Both sets of studies recommended reducing the average levels of effective protection and, 
in particular, reducing the discrimination against exports.   
  Two other noteworthy studies of developing countries were ones directed by Anne 
Krueger (1978) and Jagdish Bhagwati (1978) and by Demetris Papageorgiou, Michael Michaely, 
and Armeane Choksi (1991).  These studies investigated particular episodes of inward-looking 
and outward-looking policy actions by considering not only changes in levels of import 
protection and export subsidization but the array of macroeconomic policies utilized by 
governments, e.g., monetary policy, fiscal policy, and, especially, exchange rate policy, to 
promote import substitution or deal with its consequences.  The Bhagwati-Krueger project 
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focused on the effective exchange rates faced by importers and exporters, i.e., the nominal rates 
for imports and exports corrected for various export subsidies and for import tariffs and nontariff 
barriers, respectively.
6  Following broad guidelines, the individual country-researchers in the 
Papageorgiou-Michaely-Choksi study were asked to construct an annual index of the degree of 
trade liberalization.
7  Both these sets of studies reached the same conclusion as the two earlier 
ones, namely, that import-substitution policies generally do not produce sustainable increases in 
long-run growth rates and that outward-looking policies are more appropriate for achieving this 
goal.  They also both go into considerable detail about the process of moving from an inward-
looking to outward-looking policies and, in particular, the sequencing of trade and exchange-rate 
liberalization and the set of other policies, such as monetary, fiscal and competition policies, that 
should accompany the liberalization process.  
  There were also cross-country econometric studies in the 1970s and 1980s that attempted 
to test the relationship between trade and economic growth.  For example, using information 
from the country-studies that he directed, Balassa (1978) regressed the growth rate of exports on 
the growth of output, both including and excluding exports from the measure of output.  He 
found the strongest positive relationship when exports are included as part of output, but he also 
found a generally significant positive effect when exports are excluded from GNP.  Krueger 
(1978, chp. 11) also finds that when the growth of exports was faster the growth of GNP was 
also faster.  She did not find, however, that the extent of trade and exchange rate liberalization 
independently affects growth.  Using data based on the indices of liberalization in the 
Papageorgiou-Michaely-Choksi study, Ioannis Kessides (1991) runs a number of regressions 
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relating liberalization and growth.  Among his findings are that strong liberalization episodes are 
associated with higher increases in the rate of GDP growth than weaker episodes and that 
countries with sustained liberalization episodes experienced larger increases in the rates of GDP 
growth than countries with failed liberalization episodes. 
As this brief survey of individual country studies and cross-country statistical analyses of 
inward-looking versus outward-looking policies indicates, the many differences among 
researchers in the issues focussed on and in the economic techniques employed make is difficult 
to draw many firm conclusions.  One generalization that seem warranted is that the import-
substitution approach was not successful in promoting appreciably higher growth rates on a long-
run, sustainable basis for developing countries that wanted to participate in the global economy.  
Most countries that used this approach were forced eventually to abandon it because of chronic 
balance-of-payments and budget-deficit problems.  Those that have basically stuck with an 
inward-looking approach over the years, e.g., Pakistan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, have had 
relatively lower growth rates.  In contrast, although many developing countries that switched to 
outward-looking policies were also often forced to abandon these policies temporarily because of 
unexpected external events or domestic political pressures related to the adjustment problems 
involved, those that were able to sustain these policies over long periods seem to have grown 
more rapidly.  Another point that stands out in the various country studies is that outward-
looking and inward-looking policies involve much more than just trade and trade policies.  For 
example, a willingness to welcome foreign direct investment, to maintain market-oriented 
exchange rates, to keep the money supply under fairly tight control, to constrain government 
budget deficits and corruption, and to control monopolistic behavior by firms and industries all 
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seem to be important components of outward-looking development policies.  Attempting to 
isolate the relative importance on growth of a particular component such as the volume of 
exports or liberal versus protectionist trade policies does not seem to make much sense, since 
there are complex interrelationship among these types of policies that make them highly inter-
correlated.  In his influential review of the various investigations of trade and growth through the 
early 1990s, Sebastian Edwards (1993) is especially critical of the early cross-country statistical 
studies, which he argues are based on overly simplistic theoretical models and also are flawed for 
various econometric reasons.  More recently, T.N. Srinivasan and Jagdish Bhagwati (2001) have 
also sharply criticized cross-country regression analyses as the basis of determining the 
relationships between trade openness and growth.  In their view, due to the weak theoretical 
foundations of most of these studies, the poor quality of the data bases they must use, and 
inappropriate econometric techniques utilized in many instances, nuanced, in-depth studies of 
country experiences are the best approach for understanding the linkage between trade and 
growth.     
IV.  Openness and the New Growth Theory 
Under the traditional comparative-statics framework, either in the absence or presence of 
economic distortions, changes in trade policy lead only to one-time changes in levels of 
production, although in the real world of economic frictions one might expect to observe the shift 
to new equilibria  take place only over a number of years..  Similarly, trade-policy changes in the 
standard neo-classical model of exogenous growth brings about changes in the pattern of product 
specialization but not in the steady-state rate of growth.  An important analytical development in 
the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s, however, was the significant improvement in 
endogenous growth theory by such authors as Paul Romer (1986), Robert Lucas (1988) and 
                                                                                                                                                                           




Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991).  Part of this new growth theory focussed on the 
relationships between international trade and growth.  One of the models of Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, Chp. 6) illustrates the types of relationships stressed in the new growth theory 
and, in particular, how trade policy can affect growth rates.  To keep the model as simple as 
possible, they assume that each country is “small” in the sense of facing fixed world prices for 
the two final goods produced.  There are two factors of production, human capital (skilled labor) 
and unskilled labor whose supplies are fixed.  One of the final goods is produced with human 
capital and a fixed amount of differentiated, nontraded intermediate inputs, while the other is 
produced with unskilled labor and the same bundle of intermediate inputs.  The nontraded 
intermediate inputs are produced under monopolistically competitive conditions with both 
factors of production.  Constant returns to scale prevail for final and intermediate goods.   
Human capital is also involved in the research and development activities that create new 
varieties of intermediate goods.  These intermediate inputs are the key to increased productivity: 
each final good requires a given aggregate of intermediates but the more varieties there are in 
this aggregate, the higher output becomes.  This captures the idea that dividing tasks into smaller 
and smaller parts through specialization leads to increasing returns.  Another important aspect of 
the R&D process is that it not only produces new varieties of intermediates but also adds to the 
stock of knowledge, which is non-appropriable.  The greater this stock of knowledge, the less the 
quantity of human capital needed to produce new varieties of intermediate inputs.  Thus, the 
growth process is endogenous with R&D creating new intermediate inputs that increase the 
productivity of the needed aggregate of inputs and also add to the stock of general knowledge.  




new varieties of intermediates.  The equilibrium outcome is a constant rate of growth of factor 
productivity and a constant rate of output growth in the sectors producing the final goods. 
Now consider the effects of a tariff on the imported good.  If the country is importing the 
good that only uses human capital as a direct input and exporting the good intensively using 
unskilled labor, the import duty will raise the relative domestic price of the human capital-
intensive good and via the Stolper-Samuelson theorem raise the relative wages of skilled labor.  
This increase in the price of human capital will lower the level of R&D activity by raising its 
costs and thus lead to a lower equilibrium growth rate.  In contrast, if the country imports the 
unskilled labor-intensive goods, import protection will lower the relative wages of skilled labor 
and accelerate the growth rate.  Thus, in this model there no definite answer to whether 
protection increases or decreases the growth rate.  It depends on the pattern of imports and 
exports.  Besides using the concept of increasing returns as the driving force for endogenous 
growth, Grossman and Helpman (1991) and other growth theorists have introduced such 
concepts as knowledge spillovers resulting from trade in goods and foreign direct investment as 
well as the ability to imitate the products of foreign producers as engines of endogenous growth.  
Import protection generally reduces growth rates under these formulations. 
V. More Sophisticated Cross-Country Studies, Yet Continued Disagreement 
Motivated by the improvements in growth theory, the criticisms of earlier statistical 
analyses, the availability of more comprehensive data and new econometric techniques, 
economists devoted renewed attention in the 1990s to more sophisticated cross-country 
econometric analyses relating various measures of “outwardness” or “openness” to the growth 
rates of GDP or total factor productivity.  Almost all of these studies find a strong positive 




review of the most influential of these studies in which they focus on the effects of policy-
induced trade barriers on growth rather than on the growth effects of more general measures of 
openness, Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik (2001) express skepticism “that there is a strong 
negative relationship in the data between trade barriers and economic growth, at least for levels 
of trade restrictions observed in practice.”  Moreover (p. 39), they “view the search for such a 
relationship as futile.”  A unique feature of the Rodriguez-Rodrik analysis is that they use the 
various authors' actual data sets in undertaking various tests of the robustness of their results.  
The rest of this section examines the main studies reviewed by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and 
considers the criticisms they make of these studies. 
As Rodriguez and Rodrik point out, one of the most widely cited statistical investigations 
of outward orientation and growth is by David Dollar (1992).  (This paper was not covered in 
Edward’s 1993 review.)  Dollar bases his measure of outward orientation on estimates of the 
comparative price levels in 95 countries of an identical bundle of consumption goods calculated 
by Robert Summers and Alan Heston (1988).  As a means for eliminating that part of the 
differences in prices among countries due to country differences in the prices of nontradeables, 
Dollar first regresses their price estimates on the level and square of GDP per capita as well as 
regional dummies and then compares the predicted price levels from this regression with the 
Summer-Heston prices.  The argument is that if factor prices are not equalized, the relative prices 
of nontradables should vary systematically with differences in relative factor endowments.  Since 
good data on relative factor endowments is not available for most less developed countries, he 
uses per capita income as a measure of per capita factor availability.  Even with this procedure, 
he still finds significant anomalies for some countries with respect to the degree of trade 




distortion measure with a measure of the degree of volatility of exchange rates, he finds that the 
number of anomalies declines substantially.  
Trade economists have often explored the possibility of measuring the degree of import 
protection or export subsidization by comparing domestic prices across countries for specific 
traded goods.  However, this has generally been rejected as an adequate method of measuring 
trade barriers, since even for physically identical goods for which detailed direct information on 
levels of protection or subsidization exists, price differences are generally not good measures of 
differences in the degree of trade distortions.  Given this result and the rather rough method used 
to purge the effects of the prices of nontradeable in the Summers-Heston price measures, it is not 
surprising that Dollar finds that his price indices do not yield reasonable results for a number of 
countries.  Combining these indices with a measure of the volatility of exchange rates may give 
more reasonable results but, as Rodriguez and Rodrik argue, his variability index seems to be 
more a measure of economic instability at large rather than of trade orientation alone.   
To test for the relationship between growth and his measures of outward orientation, 
Dollar regresses growth in per capita income in 95 countries averaged over the period 1976-85 
on his trade distortion and exchange rate volatility measures as well as on the rate of investment 
in these countries over the same period.  He finds that the higher the level of trade distortion and 
the greater the exchange rate variability for a country, the lower the rate of per capita GDP 
growth.  Rodriguez and Rodrik not only have some theoretical criticisms of Dollar’s trade 
distortion index as an appropriate measure of trade restrictions but find that the regression results 
for this index are not very robust to alternative specifications of the growth equation.  For 
example, when dummy variables are added for Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan 




income and level of education reduce the explanatory power of this variable even more.  
Furthermore, when Rodriguez and Rodrik use the latest revision of the Summers and Heston data 
base for the same countries and time period covered by Dollar, the trade distortion index is not 
significant and has the wrong sign even without the addition of regional dummies.  However, the 
exchange rate variability index continues to be negative and statistically significant under all 
specifications both with the new and old database.  Thus, while Dollar has shown that exchange 
rate variability is negatively associated with growth rates, I agree with Rodriguez and Rodrik that 
he has not demonstrated that outward orientation as one would expect this to be affected by trade 
policies is significantly related to economic growth in the developing countries he studied.  
  The next, equally influential study critiqued by Rodriguez and Rodrik is by Jeffrey Sachs 
and Andrew Warner (1995).  These authors construct a zero-one dummy of openness for 79 
countries that takes a zero if any one of the following five conditions holds over the period 1970-
89: average tariff rate are over 40 percent on capital goods and intermediates, nontariff barriers 
cover 40 percent or more of imports of capital goods and intermediates, the country operates 
under a socialist economic system, there is a state monopoly of the country’s major exports, and 
the black market premium on its official exchange rate exceeded 20 percent in the 1980s or 
1990s.  A value of zero is viewed as indicating a closed economy, while a value of 1 indicates an 
open economy.  Controlling for such variables as the investment rate, government spending as a 
fraction of GDP, secondary and primary schooling, and number of revolutions and coups, Sachs 
and Warner find their openness index to be positively related to the growth rate of per capita 
GDP in a statistically significant sense.   
       In reanalyzing the Sachs-Warner data, Rodriguez and Rodrik find that two of the five 




country’s major exports and a black market foreign exchange premium of more than 20 per cent.  
(Neither the measure of tariff levels or the coverage of nontariff trade barriers is statistically 
significant when the different indicators of openness are entered separately.)  Moreover, they 
note that the state monopoly variable only covers 29 African countries undergoing structural 
adjustment programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s and, therefore, is virtually 
indistinguishable from the use of a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy.  As for the statistical 
significance of the black-market premium, they argue that this indicator is likely to be a measure 
of policy failure due to many other reasons besides simply trade policy.  
  Another paper critiqued by Rodriguez and Rodrik is one by Sebatian Edwards (1998), the 
author of the review of the various studies on the trade and growth through the 1980s and early 
1990s mentioned earlier, i.e., Edwards (1993).  One of Edward’s main criticisms in that paper of 
the cross-country statistical studies in that period is their failure to test in a systematic way for 
the robustness of the results obtained.  In his 1998 paper, Edwards tries to remedy this 
shortcoming.  He tests the robustness of the extent to which nine different measures of trade 
policy are related to total factor productivity growth.  His nine measures of openness are: (i) the 
Warner-Sachs index just discussed; (ii) a subjective World Bank classification of trade strategies; 
(iii) Edward Leamer’s (1988) index of openness based on the residuals from regressions 
explaining trade flows; (iv) the average black market premium on a country’s official foreign 
exchange rate; (v) average levels of import tariffs calculated by UNCTAD and taken from Barro 
and Lee (1994); (vi) the average coverage of nontariff trade barriers taken from the same source; 
(vii) a subjective index of trade distortions formulated by the Heritage Foundation; (viii) the ratio 
of taxes on imports and exports to total trade; and (ix) a regression-based index of import 




openness on estimates that he calculates of ten-year averages of total factor productivity from 
1960-90 for 93 developed and developing countries.  Controlling for initial per capita GDP in 
1965 and the average number of years of education in 1965, he finds that six of the nine 
measures of openness are statistically significant in the expected direction.  
  Rather ironically, given Edward’s emphasis on the need to test for robustness by using 
alternative specifications, Rodriguez and Rodrik find that his results are heavily dependent on the 
fact that he weighs his regressions by per capita GDP.  If one weighs by the log of per capita 
GDP or uses White’s (1980) method of dealing with the heteroskedasticity problem, the number 
of Edward’s nine openness measures that are significant drops to five and four, respectively.  
The four significant openness measures that are significant when White’s correction for 
heteroskedasticity is used are the World Bank’s subjective classification of trade regimes, the 
black market exchange-rate premium, the subjective index of trade distortions calculated by the 
Heritage Foundation, and the ratio of trade taxes to total trade.  With respect to the latter 
variable, Rodriguez and Rodrik find that recalculating this variable based on more recent data 
than was not available to Edwards fails to yield a significant sign when introduced into the 
regression on total factor productivity.  They also note that the Heritage Foundation index was 
calculated for trade restrictions existing in 1996, whereas Edward’s estimates cover the decade of 
the 1980s.  When they calculate a similar index that is based on 1980s data, it is no long 
statistically significant in explaining the growth rate of total factor productivity.  They also 
object to the use of this measure as well as the one from the World Bank as being subjective 
measures that they believe are “apparently highly contaminated by judgement biases or lack 




mentioned earlier, they regard changes in the exchange rate premium as being influenced more 
by basic macroeconomic policies than trade policies.  
  Two additional recent papers on the subject are by Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer 
(1999) and by David Dollar and Aart Kraay (June 2001).  Frankel and Romer directly address 
the question: Does trade cause growth?  Like others, they point out that OLS regressions of per 
capita income on the ratio of export or imports and other variables, which generally find a 
positive relationship between trade shares and income per person, may not indicate the effect of 
trade on growth due to the endogeneity of the trade share.  Countries whose incomes are high for 
reasons not related to trade may have high trade ratios.  They, therefore, use geographic 
characteristics of countries that they believe are not influenced by incomes or government 
policies and other factors affecting income to obtain instrumental variables estimates of trade’s 
effect on income.  Specifically, they include in their trade equation the size of countries, their 
distance from each other, whether they share a border, and whether they are landlocked.  Their 
main finding is that there is no evidence that ordinary least-squares estimates overstate the 
effects of trade.  They are careful to point out, however, that this does not mean that changes in 
trade resulting from policy actions affect growth in the same manner as from their geographic 
variables, because there are many different mechanisms by which trade can affect income.  But 
they argue (see Frankel and Romer, p. 395) that the effects of geography-based differences in 
trade are “at least suggestive about the effects of policy-induced differences.”   
  Rodriguez and Rodrik also critique this paper and argue that the geographically 
constructed measure by Frankel and Romer may not be a valid instrumental variable.  The reason 
is that geography is likely to be a determinant of income through many more channels than just 




exposure to various diseases.  When they include distance from the equator or percentage of land 
in the tropics, or a set of regional dummies in the Frankel-Romer instrumental-variable income 
regressions, their constructed trade-share variable is no longer statistically significant.  However, 
Frankel and Romer report that when they also include distance from the equator as a control 
variable there is still no evidence that ordinary least-squares regressions overstate the influence 
of trade on income.  
  The final paper considered here is one by David Dollar and Aart Kraay (2001).  The 
unique feature of their regression analysis is its focus on within-country (rather than cross-
country) decadal changes in growth rates and changes in the volume of trade, which the authors 
regard “as an imperfect proxy for changes in trade policy.”  Because of this approach, they 
argue, their results are not driven by geography or other unobserved country characteristics that 
influence growth but vary little over time, such as institutional conditions.  They also introduce 
period dummies to control for shocks that are common to all countries, such as global demand 
shocks or reductions in transportation costs.  Their data set consists of 187 observations on 
growth in the 1990s and on growth in the 1980s, covering roughly 100 countries.   
  Dollar and Kraay find a strong and significant positive relationship between the effect of 
changes in trade on changes in growth in their instrumental-variable regressions.  Moreover, 
introducing a measure of the willing of individuals to hold liquid assets via financial 
intermediaries (interpreted as a measure of the quality of a country’s institutions) as well as other 
omitted policies that affect growth and are correlated with increases in trade, such as changes in 
government expenditures as a share of gross national product, changes in the rate of inflation, 
and changes in the number of revolutions, does not change the high level of statistical 




regarded as endogenous to growth and the authors, therefore, simultaneously instrument for all 
of the right-hand variables, the result is a loss of statistical significance of the changes-in-trade-
volume variable.  They conclude, consequently, “that the available data on trade, growth and 
other policies may not be sufficiently informative to enable us to isolate the precise partial effect 
of trade on growth, since our instruments are not sufficiently informative.”   
V. Conclusions 
  What are we to conclude from this survey of empirical studies about the relationships 
between openness and growth, besides the fact that there is disagreement among economists on 
the matter?  As noted in the introductory section, a key reason for the disagreement seems to 
relate to differences among authors in what they mean by the concept of openness.  Rodriguez 
and Rodrik, for example, focus on the relationship between growth and trade openness, as 
reflected by “policy-induced barriers to international trade.”  In appraising the various studies 
they cover, they consider levels of import duties and measures of the restrictiveness of nontariff 
barriers to be the most appropriate indicators of trade openness.  They are aware, however, of the 
limitations of the existing measures of these indicators of trade openness.  Simple tariff averages 
weighted by imports tend to underweight the restrictiveness of high tariffs due to the low level of 
imports.  (A tariff so high that there are no imports is a case in point.)  Available comprehensive 
measures of nontariff barriers only measure the number of different type of nontariff trade 
barriers that a country has introduced and thus do not distinguish between the degree of 
restrictiveness of these measures.  
  In contrast to Rodriguez and Rodrik, most authors both of studies of development 
episodes in particular countries and of statistical analyses of such periods across a large number 




Bhagwati-Krueger and Papageorgiou-Michaely-Choksi, for example, specifically focus on 
exchange rates as well as trade barriers and also examine the monetary, fiscal and regulatory 
policies that accompanied market-opening or market-closing episodes.  This is why these writers 
as well as those undertaking cross-country statistical studies describe the effects of the policies 
they are studying on a country in terms of such broad phrases as its outward-orientation and 
openness in describing the policies they are studying.  However, according to Rodriguez and 
Rodrik: “To the extent that the empirical literature demonstrates a positive causal link from 
openness to growth, the main operational implication is that governments should dismantle their 
barriers to trade.”   
  Most of the authors of this literature would, I think, strongly object to this narrow 
interpretation of the policy implications of their work.  While they generally favor the reduction 
of high tariff and non-tariff barriers in developing countries, these authors also call for other 
policy changes aimed at eliminating large government deficits, curtailing inflationary monetary 
policies, maintaining market-oriented exchange rates, increasing competition among domestic 
firms, reducing government corruption, improving the education system, strengthening the legal 
system and so forth.  As the country studies have clearly demonstrated, not only are high tariff 
levels usually associated with highly restrictive nontariff measures, export subsidies to selected 
sectors, overvalued exchange rates, large government deficits, extensive rent-seeking and 
corruption, unstable governments, and so forth, but significant reductions in trade barriers are 
also accompanied by important liberalization efforts in these non-trade policy areas.  The 
extensive multicolinearity among the policy variables affecting these conditions is the reason 
why both researchers who undertake both cross-country statistical analyses and individual 




use a broad openness measure such as price differences that clearly are affected by much more 
than just trade policies affecting the individual commodities. 
  The general strategy followed by Rodriguez and Rodrik in critiquing the various studies 
involves examining the individual components of the general measures of openness used by the 
authors to find out if the tariff and nontariff trade components in these measures are by 
themselves related to economic growth in a statistically significant manner, determining if 
introducing plausible additional variables not directly related to trade policy change the 
significance levels of the trade variables, and exploring whether modifying the econometric 
techniques followed in a seemingly reasonable manner results in a loss of significance of the 
trade variables.  As the summary of their findings presented in this paper show, they generally 
find that tariffs and nontariff coverage either are not statistically significant by themselves or lose 
their significance when other variables are added in the regression equations or different 
econometric techniques are utilized.  
  It is quite true that those recommending changes in economic policies in developing 
countries sometimes make statements implying that just lowering trade barriers will raise growth 
rates, and we should be grateful to Rodriguez and Rodrik for pointing out that the available 
empirical evidence does not support this claim.  Of course, the quality of the existing data on the 
restrictiveness of tariffs and nontariff trade barriers is so poor that when better data become 
available we may find this relationship may indeed hold under certain circumstances.  But, it is a 
caricature of the positions of most economists in academia or in governmental institutions to 
maintain that they fail to realize and recommend the necessity of policy changes beyond just 
those covering trade to stimulate sustained increases in growth rates.  Especially since the 




emphasized the need, as a minimum, for a stable and non-discriminatory exchange-rate system 
and the need for prudent monetary and fiscal policies and corruption-free administration of 
economic policies for trade liberalization to be effective in the long-run. 
  The evidence that a general policy position of openness is preferable to long-run 
economic growth than an inward-looking policy stance should not be interpreted, however, as 
implying that no government interventions, such as selective production subsidies or controls on 
short-term capital movements, are appropriate at certain stages of development.  We know from 
the individual country studies that policy-makers in some economies, such as South Korea, in 
shifting from policies favoring import-substitution policies to an outward-oriented policy 
approach actively intervened to promote exports.  Some authors maintain that they succeeded in 
spite of these interventionist activities due to the predominance of liberalizing policies, but it 
may be that some of these government actions actually helped to raise growth rates.  In my view, 
the individual country and cross-country studies support the conclusion that, on balance, general 
economic openness is much more favorable to growth than a general inward-looking economic 
approach but that some policies regarded as causing static economic distortions may be 
appropriate at certain times and under various circumstances.  As Rodrik (2002) argues in an 
introductory essay to a series of country studies he has organized, we urgently need more studies 
that try give guidance on just what these times and circumstances are.  One type of study that 
should be undertaken more extensively is the careful monitoring of the direct and indirect effects 
of liberalization measures from the outset of their introduction.  
  The statistical finding that increases in exports and increased growth are generally 
positively related in a significant statistical sense also involves the problem of causation.  The 




unrelated to a government’s policy actions.  As noted earlier, the export increase also may be the 
consequence of economic growth rather than the cause.  Furthermore, the use of exports as an 
openness measure has the drawback of being a component of GDP, the usual measure of 
economic growth.  
  Consequently, as Rodriguez and Rodrik argue, not only does the search for the 
relationship between trade barriers and growth seem futile, but it does not even seem to make 
much sense to investigate what the empirical evidence is on this relationship in view of the 
complex interrelationships between trade policy and other government policies and various 
macroeconomic variables when one is talking about trade policy actions covering a wide group 
of goods, e.g., manufactures, rather than a particular industry.  Actually most of the country 
studies, particularly the later ones, have been concerned with government policies that cover 
much more than narrowly-defined trade barriers to international trade.  
 It is true developing countries are often given the policy advice that decreasing trade 
barriers is a more effective way of achieving higher sustainable rates of growth than tightening 
trade restrictions.  But, those giving such advice also emphasize the need, as a minimum, for a 
stable and non-discriminatory exchange-rate system and usually also the need for prudent 
monetary and fiscal policies and corruption-free administration of economic policies for trade 
liberalization to be effective in the long-run.  It seems to me that the various country studies do 
support this type of policy advice and that the cross-country statistical studies do not overturn 
this conclusion.  But the recent critiques of these latter studies demonstrate that we must be 
careful in attributing any single economic policy, such as the lowering of trade barriers, as being 
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